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Abstract
The growing use of the concept of an affordance raises questions about its meaning and has led to
much debate. This exploratory evaluation of usage reveals divergent meanings, exposes tensions and
explains why there is confusion about the concept. The notion of an affordance focuses attention upon
possible action, raising the issue of how affordances give rise to action. The discussion reveals latency
in the nature of affordances, that they do not exist in isolation, can be designed into artefacts and have
social, temporal and spatial dimensions for their actualization. An affordance is a necessary condition
for its enactment, but sufficiency arises with the situatedness of enactment. Moreover, an affordance,
which is actualized through its enactment, is thus performative. It is concluded that the term affordance
should be used with caution and with more precision and rigour, as its everyday use is fraught with
vagueness saying little about the complex dynamics that underpins affordance as a concept.
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1.0

Introduction

The term ‘affordance’ has recently pervaded the literatures, including that of
Information Systems (e.g. Conole & Dyke, 2004; Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak,
Dougherty, & Faraj, 2007; Leonardi, 2011; Robey, Raymond & Anderson, 2012;
Treem & Leonardi, 2013; Goel. Johnson, Junglas & Ives, 2013; Gibbs, Rozaidi &
Eisemberg, 2013; Fayard & Weeks, 2014). But why? Ever since the pioneering work
of the Tavistock Institute in the 1950s (Trist, 1981) there has been recognition that the
workplace cannot be split between technical and social systems. Instead, their
interplay has given rise to profusion of conceptualisations, e.g. ‘socio-technical
systems’ (Trist, 1981), ‘seamless web’ (Hughes, 1986), heterogeneous assemblages’
(Larkin, 1969, Landstrom, 2000), ‘socio-technical ensembles’ (Bijker (1995: 269),
‘sociotechnical constituencies’ (Molina, 1990, 1997) or ‘sociomaterial assemblages’
(Suchman, 2007; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). However, these terms disguise the
nature of this complex entanglement (Orlikowski, 2005), mangle (Pickering, 1993)
and imbrication (Leonardi, 2011) of technology and the human agent. Nevertheless,
despite these rich insights, they fail to address the question of why a technology is
taken up. On the one hand, the essentialist view emphasises the role of the properties
of artefacts, is deterministic (e.g. Winner, 1980). On the other, the anti-essentialist
emphasises the meaning held about an artefact, and the manner in which inscriptions
embedded in the artefact are read (e.g. Grint & Woolgar, 1997).
In contrast, the notion of affordance provides a bridge between the social and artefact,
offering a concept to explain why a technology is taken up, operating at the microlevel of the detail of human activity (c.f. Cos-Aguilera, Hayes, & Cañamero, 2004;
Zammuto et al, 2007; Markus & Silver, 2008). Hutchby (2001), succinctly captures
the argument when presenting the Gibsonian affordance as an alternative to the

diametrical opposing essentialist and anti-essentialist views about technology.
Affordances privileges neither view, instead supporting a mutually shaping
perspective: “technologies can be understood as artefacts which may be both shaped
by and shaping of the practices humans use in interaction with, around and through
them” (Hutchby, 2001: 444). However, how does affordance explain this interplay
between the social and artefact?
The term ‘affordance’ was introduced by James J. Gibson in 1966, but it was in his
seminal work “The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception” (1979) that he
developed his ‘theory of affordances’, which has since been the topic of much debate.
This debate, which initially pre-occupied mainly psychologists, quickly shifted to
researchers interested in the relationship between people and technology, in particular,
Information Systems. One of the reasons for this on-going debate is that Gibson’s
formulation of the term has been ambiguous (Şahin, Çakmak, Doğar, Uğur, Üçoluk;
2007), allowing for misunderstanding (McGrenere & Ho, 2000; Norman, 2013)) and
confusion (Şahin, et al., 2007). However, Jones (2003) reveals how Gibson’s thinking
about affordances had evolved over time, suggesting that perhaps a clearer
explanation would have emerged should the opportunity have presented itself.
Nevertheless, that the debate has been on-going suggests that there is much interest in
how in the concept of affordances can serve as an instrument in discourse about the
relationship between humans and artefacts. However, the manner in which the term is
used still reveals diversity and ambiguity in how the term is used, which merely
serves to confuse.
This paper explores the manner in which the concept of affordances has been used in
a wide range of literatures. It draws upon a large pool of papers, though selectively
focuses upon those which provide conceptual development. This study commences
with a brief examination of the work of James Gibson and Donald Norman, then
provides a thematic evaluation of subsequent formulisations of the term affordance.
The contribution is to provide a preliminary overview of how the notion of affordance
can be interpreted.

2.0

Origin and early debates about the term

1.1 James Gibson
James Gibson, an ‘ecological psychologist’, ‘coined’ (1966) or ‘made up’ (1979) the
word affordance to mean “something that refers to both the environment and the
animal… The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson, 1979: 127), i.e. can be both
positive (e.g. beneficial) and negative (e.g. injurious). Whereas the meaning of an
object may change with the observer’s changing needs, the affordances offered do not
change, are invariant, being always present. However, an affordance is not a property
or quality residing in either the object or subject, but relates to how objects are
perceived with regard to their possibilities for use. Affordances, “are properties of
things taken with reference to an observer but not properties of the experiences of the
observer” (Gibson, 1979: 137), “they are neither physical nor phenomenal” (Gibson,
1979: 143). An affordance is not bestowed upon an object by a need of an observer
and his act of perceiving it. The object offers what it does because it is what it is”
(Gibson, 1979: 139). As such, affordances cut across the objective-subjective

dichotomy. That affordances can be misperceived raises a critical question of how
affordances are perceived – what information (stimuli) is there.
Whilst Gibson, in his earlier work, draws attention to the role of learning when
making sense of objects, Eleanor Gibson, his wife, reveals that learning was “not
something that my husband thought a lot about” (Szokolszky, 2003: 271), though was
an issue which interested her:
And so, in designing a learning theory that fits development I have also used
the notion of affordances. I think now that what is learned are affordances, and
differentiation is a process that explains refining learning and behavior. But
my notion of learning is really perceptual learning; I think that it is a discovery
process. Children discover affordances through observation and consequences
of their exploration. (Szokolszky, 2003: 274)
Perceptual learning is described as “equally the means of discovering distinctive
features and invariant properties of things and events” (Gibson, 2000: 295).
Moreover, whilst it commences as exploratory activity (e.g. visually examining or
trialing), it “can become performatory as an affordance is discovered. This shift is
marked by making contact with the environment and ensuing control of it”
(Szokolszky, 2003: 297).
Gibson’s contribution is to draw attention to the action capabilities of observers,
relative to that perceived.
1.2 Donald Norman
An alternative view was developed by Norman (1988). Norman, a cognitive
psychologist, defined affordance as referring “to the perceived and actual properties
of the thing, primarily those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing
could possibly be used” (Norman, 1988: 9). He acknowledges:
I believe that affordances result from the mental interpretation of things, based
on our past knowledge and experience applied to our perception of the things
about us. My view is somewhat in conflict with the views of many Gibsonian
psychologists, but this internal debate within modern psychology is of little
relevance here (Norman, 1988: 219).
Gibson’s example of a door draws attention to the importance of a signal, which
informs us how to act, but that also that it is important to determine what are
permissible actions based on affordances and constraints.
However, Norman’s view is later revised and clarified:
the term affordance refers to the relationship between a physical object and a
person… An affordance is a relationship between the properties of an object
and the capabilities of the agent that determine just how the object could
possibly be used… Whether an affordance exists depends upon the properties
of both the object and agent (Norman, 2013: 11).
This reveals a shift from a properties emphasis to a relational perspective, with the
warning of confusing properties as affordances. Counter to affordances are antiaffordances that (constraints) prevent interaction and use. Moreover, affordance need
not be visible, yet still exist, raising the distinction between real (physically present),
perceived (appearances - signifiers) and invisible affordances. Thus, when interacting
with an object, the challenge is to understand how to use it. This raises the question of
how appropriate use is discovered. Norman draws upon Gibson’s view, that the senses

“pick-up information about the world” (Norman, 2013: 12), with signals (information)
contained within affordances revealing what is possible: “affordances determine what
actions are possible. Signifiers [are signals that] communicate where the action should
take place” (Norman, 2013: 14). Designers of objects, in order to make them
understandable, can create ‘signifiers’ to reveal where to act, i.e. a signal
“communicates appropriate behaviour” (Norman, 2013: 14).

3.0

Gibson versus Norman

Whilst there appear to be similarities between the two formulisations of affordances,
they are distinctively different as noted by McGrenere & Ho (2000) and Sahin et al.
(2007). Whilst a Gibsonian affordance is directly perceived, Norman’s affordance
involves cognition, visibility and discoverability. For Gibson, an affordance is
invariant and pertains to the object, though is not a property and exists with reference
to the agent. In contrast, the focus of attention for Norman’s affordance is upon the
relationship between the properties of an object and the capabilities of the agent.
Moreover, an affordance can be invisible, though an object can be designed to
incorporate signals that enable affordances to be discovered.
These different conceptualisations reflect the different orientations of Gibson and
Norman; Gibson, who was concerned with the visual perception of affordances and
did not make the distinction between human and animal, and Norman, whose interest
lay with the design and utility of technology (McGrenere & Ho, 2000). However,
these differences, together with lack of clarity in Gibson’s account of affordance
(illustrated in the difficulty in establishing the nature of the relational aspect tacitly
invoked in the Gibsonian affordance), has led to confusion about how to use the
concept of affordance (Şahin, et al., 2007), as illustrated by McGrenere & Ho (2000:
5): “yet most who cite Gibson and perhaps even quote him resort to using the meaning
given by Norman”. Nevertheless, Kaptelinin & Nardi (2012) defend Gibson from
criticism about any deficiencies with regard to his formulation of his theory:
Gibson’s notion of affordance as “natural affordances”, such as those for
manipulation and locomotion, is consistent with the overall aims of his
research project which centered on perception. It would be unfair to criticize
Gibson for not developing the notion of affordance beyond natural
affordances, i.e., to criticize him for not choosing a different research agenda.
Therefore, while current debate clearly indicates that Gibson’s original notion
is too limited to properly serve the needs of HCI research and practice, the
notion has its own inherent contours, and cannot be “upgraded” without being
transformed into something it is not (Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2012: 970-971).

4.0

Deconstructing the usage of ‘affordances’ into its constituent
elements

One of the relatively consistent views about an affordance is that it concerns the
possible actions that an object offers. However, a more detailed evaluation of how
others have used the term affordances reveals variety in the underlying concepts.
Aside from differences in definition, there are differences in such issues as how
viewed as a process and whether are perceived or interpreted, are relational or
dispositional, or are representational or performative. To add are material, social,

spatial and temporal dimensions. Finally, there are debates surrounding the design of
affordances.
Definition: One of the difficulties with the concept of affordances is that it is unclear
what an affordance is. A cursory examination of the variety of definitions to be found
in the literatures reveals the idiosyncratic nature of what constitutes an affordance (c.f.
Lindberg & Lyytinen, 2013). Moreover, the concept lacks precision (Jarzabkowski &
Pinch (2013). Affordances have been defined in terms of an offering (Gibson, 1979),
relations (Stoffregen, 2000; Chemeo, 2000, 2003), properties (Norman, 1988; Gaver,
1991; Turvey, 1992), and functionality (Cos-Aguilera et al., 2004). Indeed, it
subsumes both functionality and behavior (Maier & Fadel, 2001). It can reside in the
object (Gibson, 1979, Gaver, 1991; Turvey, 1992) or are emergent in the relations
between object and subject (Stoffregen, 2000; Chemero, 2003). There is clear
divergence about what constitutes an affordance, illustrated by Sahin et al. (2007)
who, through a systematic process of formulating a definition for the affordance of
autonomous robotics, establish five definitions, each pertaining to a different
viewpoint. To add, is the study of the affordances of spaces and buildings, with
implications on human practices (Fayard and Weeks, 2005; Maier, Fadel & Battisto
(2009); Mittleman, 2009). Affordances are offered, not only by the object, but also by
space which has implications for the design of space (Atmodiwirjo, 2014). Faraj &
Azad (2012) acknowledge the many different meanings of affordance but conclude
that it is perhaps counterproductive to establish ‘one true meaning’. Whilst it may be
incorrect to state that there are right and wrong definitions, this does raise the
desirability of more precise articulations of the term is being used to avoid
misunderstanding.
Affordances as process: Since the concept of an affordance relates to possible actions,
this raises the question of how, i.e. what is the process which results in an affordance
being sought, recognised and actualised. Bernhard, Recker & Burton-Jones’s (2013)
deconstruction of this process, drawing upon research in the Information Systems
domain, commences with an (1) object with ‘existing’ affordances and a (2) user with
intent. Affordances are (3) perceived, implying there is (4) information available to
reveal their presence, and (5) actualised, involving (6) effort (i.e. how easy is
actualisation), which gives rise to (7) effects. This draws attention to the semiotic as
aspects of affordances (i.e. the nature of the signifier), and whether it correctly
perceived as such. Moreover, it is proposed that this deconstruction usefully avoids
the argument (e.g. McGrenere & Ho, 2000; Hutchby, 2001; Leonardi, 2011; Robey et
al, 2012; Norman, 2013) of whether affordances reside in the object, user or the
relationship between the two and what constitutes these affordances. Affordances
exist, are perceived and are actualised in a process that spans time. Pollock (2012)
proposes the term ‘affordizing’ to denote the actualisation of an affordance. However,
Markus & Silver (2008) claim that affordances offer ‘potentially necessary’
conditions for usage, but that that these are neither necessary not sufficient conditions
for usage. Strong, Volkoff, Johnson, Pelletier, Tulu, Bar-On Trudel & Garber (2014)
offer a theory for the actualisation of an affordance, which is conceived as an
individual journey, with each journey being unique. Individual journeys, which may
involve learning, overcoming obstacles and misdirections, collectively allow
organisational objectives to be achieved, thus constituting an organisational journey,
which can thus involve more than one person.

Directly perceived or interpreted: The notion that an affordance is interpreted is
counter to Gibson’s notion that objects are directly perceived, though does align with
Norman’s view of the need for an agent to discover and determine affordances. This
creates a role for cognition, but cognition, it is claimed, introduces an inaccessible
‘magical and mysterious’ element into the formulation of an affordance (Bærentsen &
Trettvik, 2002). The need to perceive or cognise an affordance draws attention to
Norman’s distinction between perceived and invisible affordances, which need
signalling (signifers or information), to which Gaver (1991) adds ‘false’ affordances,
which gives rise to mistaken actions. Thus, an engagement with an object may be
undermined due to mis-interpretation or lack of information about what it offers. This
can lead to exploratory activity, the discovery of new information and the detection of
new affordances, these being ‘sequential affordances’ or ‘nested affordances’ if
‘grouped in space’ (Gaver, 1991). The example of a door handle reveals this
progressive mode of discovery:
For instance, the pivoting door handle… may appear to afford grasping, but
passive observation will probably not indicate the affordance of turning it or
using it to open the door. However, once grasped (B), a random or exploratory
press downwards will convey tactile information revealing the affordance of
turning the handle. When the handle is fully turned (C), the new configuration
is one from which pulling is natural. The results of a pull will indicate whether
the door affords opening or not. (Gaver, 1991: 81)
The progression from grasping to turning to pulling is sequential, but is nested within
the affordance of opening the door. This, perhaps, is illustrative of the more general
notion of how one learns about affordances which Gibson (2000) labels ‘perceptual
learning’.
A relational or dispositional view of affordance: Gibson’s (1977) notion of an
affordance is that it is neither a property of an object nor of a subject or agent, but
exists with reference to how perceived. This invokes some form of translation
between property of object and perception by agent, which has been interpreted as
denoting affordance as being a relational concept (e.g. Hutchby, 2001; Chemero,
2003; Stoffregen, 2003; Cos-Aguilera et al., 2004; Vyas, Chisalalita & van der Veer,
2006; Şahin, et al., 2007). For example, Cos-Aguilera et al., (2004) take the view that
affordances are related to task, environment and agent and, whilst embracing the view
of affordances as function, also hold the view that affordances are dependent upon the
agent’s morphology and internal behaviours and goals. The affordances are in the
relationship. Likewise, Vyas et al, 2006 view affordances as an ‘interactional’
relationship, whereby affordances emerge during the interaction between user and
environment, with this relationship being interpretative. However, whilst there may be
general agreement that affordances are relational, there are different explanations of
how this relationship is brought about.
For example, Stoffregen (2003) argues that the actualisation of an affordance becomes
an emergent property of the conjoined elements (animal and environment), which
together offers the affordance: “affordances are properties of the animal–environment
system, and they exist only at the level of the animal–environment system”
(Stoffregen, 2003: 124), thus they are emergent properties. This definition emphasises
that affordances are opportunities irrespective of whether actualised, but that
actualisation (behaviour) arises when complementary affordances AND intentions are
conjoined. This allows the availability and persistence of many options in terms of

affordances and intentions within the animal-environment system, of which only one
is actualised.
In contrast, Bærentsen & Trettvik (2002) argue that, since affordances have activity as
their focus, then there is a call for a theory that has activity as the mediating element
between subject and object. However, they argue that Gibson’s view of activity is
inadequate as it ignores the development of human activity from a cultural and
historical perspective (e.g. the division of labour). They draw upon activity theory
developed by Vygotsky, Leont’ev and others. Activities comprise of motivations,
goals, which are adapted to the operational conditions. Operations can be viewed at
both biological (sensory motor systems) and consciousness levels. Gibson’s focus
upon the behavioural aspect relates to the operational aspect at the biological level.
In contrast, Turvey (1992) argues that possibilities for action are grounded in latent,
potential or dispositional affordances, which has led to the formulisation of
affordances as dispositions, where a disposition is a ‘causal propensity’ to realise
actualisation, this requiring particular conditions, Moreover, all affordances have a
complement that is an ‘effectivity’, which is “the casual propensity for an animal to
effect or bring about a particular action… [in other words is] a dispositional property
of an organism” (Turvey, 1992: 179). Thus, if there is no complement, then there can
be no dispositional property, which implies that an affordance or effectivity cannot
exist without the existence of the other. Further, Turvey states “Dispositionals [or
causal propensities] never fail to be actualized when conjoined with suitable
circumstances. Disposition and suitable circumstances equals actuality” (Turvey,
1992: 178).
Turvey’s (1992) dispositional view of affordances which emphasis the object, has
been developed by Fayard & Weeks (2014), who propose an integrative perspective
toward affordances, argue that affordances are both relational and dispositional,
drawing upon Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of habitus to explicate the social
underpinnings in complementing affordances as a middle-ground theory that can not
explain the socio-cultural context of this relation. Habitus, defined by Bourdieu (1977:
214) “as a system of dispositions”, highlights the social nature of personal
development. Whilst affordances draw focuses attention upon the relationship
between artefacts and socially embedded individuals, habitus gives account of the
manner of the social embedding of individuals.
Affordance as representation or as performative: The notion of an affordance as a
representation is countered by the view that it is performative. Steedman (2002)
presents a representational model of affordances, relating these to the formation of
language used in planning purposeful action, this denying Gibson’s notion of direct
perception. Instead, actions are cognitively represented. Thus, whilst affordances
relate to properties, they are related through preconditions and consequences: “If the
precondition is a conditional stimulus such as a light, and the consequence is a
reward, such as food, while the action concerned is pecking or pressing a bar, then it
can be considered as a representation of an operant in the cognitive sense…”
(Steedman, 2002: 733). This formulization relates objects to events in a manner that
applies to human cognition and/or natural language semantics: the affordance exists as
a representation. However, Steedman acknowledges that one of the challenges of this
view is that little is known about the cognition of how objects are conceptualised.

More recently, Burton-Jones & Grange (2013) drew association between affordances
and representation theory. The underpinning argument of representation theory is that
the system represented within an information system is perhaps the only means
available to observe the represented system (e.g. inventory records to observe
inventory in a warehouse). Whilst representations assist understanding of situations,
this is invoked in the cognitive perspective of affordances which requires
understanding of how to realize the intended outcome.
In contrast, is a view that the affordance manifests through its actualization, that an
affordance is performative. This was suggested by Eleanor Gibson, whereby, through
the process of discovering what is being afforded, at the point of its discovery
becomes performatory (Gibson, 2000). Similarly, Cos-Aguilera et al. (2004) describe
actions as being performed, with the ‘set of affordances’ being defined by the
possibility of behaviours being performed. Likewise, Volkoff & Strong (2013) refer to
the actualisation of an affordance as performed. However, the strongest case for the
performative nature of affordances is presented by Lindberg & Lyytinen (2013), who
view affordances as both social constructivist and performative. Whilst any
understanding of potential use is socially formed, it is in the practical engagement
when an affordance is performed, that defines the affordance. Lindberg & Lyytinen
(2013) draw upon Feldman & Pentland (2003) to propose two levels of affordance:
‘ostensive’ (affordances as abstractions) and ‘performative’ (affordances as
enactment). Ostensive affordances are instantiated as performative affordances in
their enactment.
The material dimension: Lindberg & Lyytinen (2013) explain the link between
affordance and materiality: “an object has materiality because it conveys affordances,
not because it is solid… [Since] affordances create action possibilities, the object
impinges on the world, and its implication in activities makes it materiality real,
whether it is solid or not” (Lindberg & Lyytinen, 2013: 47). This can be interpreted to
suggest that, irrespective of an object’s physical or digital form, by virtue of its
presence, it is the materiality of the object that affords possibilities for action. This is
illustrated in Treem & Leonardi’s (2012) examination of how organizations use social
media, which is undertaken using a relational view of affordances.
The social dimension: The notion of affordances has tended to be used in a singular
sense – the affordances of an object with regard to an agent, e.g. a door handle.
However, the everyday comprises of many people who selectively engage with many
objects. Gaver (1996) draws attention to the social implications of affordances that
they do not exist solely for individual actions but also for social interaction.
Moreover, that through affordances “social activities are embedded in and shaped by
the material environment” (Gaver, 1996: 112). Their selection and use is, as proposed
by Gibson (2000), the outcome of learning to discriminate in this material
environment, which is, in part, determined by the observer’s “culture, social setting,
experience and intentions” (Gaver, 1991: 81). Thus, any analysis should establish the
nature of the complex of factors that shape social interaction (Gaver, 1996). Similarly,
Vyas et al. (2006) view the interaction between user and technology as socially and
culturally constructed, which raises awareness of social and cultural contexts. This
sociocultural domain is also made evident when considering the use of technology as
practice, the notion of practice invoking social structures and thus social groups. This
invokes Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of habitus, which Fayard & Weeks (2014)

introduce to denote the social nature of practice. Thus a more meaningful view of
affordances is one that can be extended to user groups. This has been explored by
Leonardi (2013) who proposes the distinction between affordances that are
idiosyncratically enacted (individualized affordances), those that arise through the
synchronised activities that use different affordances collectively (collective
affordances) and those that arise through similar usage (shared affordances).
This draws attention to the social context within which practices manifest and the
inherent complexity of the interplay between technology and the human agent within
this social context. Lindberg & Lyytinen (2013) have introduced the concept of
‘affordance ecologies’, with the ecology metaphor being is used to invoke thinking
about this complexity and dynamicity, which comprises of three domains:
infrastructure, organization and practice.
An environmental (spatial) dimension: An alternative view of affordance draws upon
Gibson’s notion of how an animal interacts with its ‘environment’. This shifts
attention away from the specifics of the artefact to the arrangement of artefacts within
a space and how space is designed and used. The affordances offered by space have
been examined by Maier & Fadel (2003), Maier, Fadel & Battisto (2009) and
Koutamanis (2005) in the context of architecture, Fayard & Weeks (2005), in the
context of the office and Atmodiwirjo (2014) in the context of autistic children. The
organisation of space and artefacts can create an environment that comprises of
meaningful multiplicities of affordances that support sensory integration and enhance
experience (Atmodiwirjo; 2014). More specifically, Fayard & Weeks (2005) reveal
how space can be used to bring people together (i.e. affords proximity), to deny access
to people (i.e. afford privacy) and to support informal interaction (i.e. affords
legitimacy). Strong et al. (2014) that a multiplicity or bundle of affordances, which
may be interrelated, may be actualised at different times drawing attention to a
temporal dimension.
Do events (a temporal dimension) have affordances? This temporal dimension is
highlighted in a debate, triggered by Stoffregen (2000), about whether an event has
affordances. Stoffregen (2000) argues that affordances and events are qualitatively
different, defining events as static (i.e. stationary) and dynamic (i.e. moving)
properties of objects and surfaces defined (i.e. measures) independent of the observer”
(Stoffregen, 2000: 6). Whilst affordances are defined with respect to an animal and
invoke behaviour, events though being properties, are not defined with respect to an
animal and do not refer to behaviour. Thus, events cannot be perceived, whereas
affordances can.
Respondents to this claim included Chemero (2000), Gibson (2000) and Bingham
(2000). Chemero (2000) questions Stoffregen, particularly his claim that events may
not be perceived. Events are defined as “changes in the layout of affordances of the
animal-environment system” (Chemero, 2000: 39). Using the example of an
experiment involving stepping across a gap between moving platforms (e.g. a boat at
dock) an event arises when the gap becomes uncrossable (i.e. is action related).
Gibson (2000a), is more emphatic claiming that “there is no such thing as perceiving
an affordance without perceiving events” (Gibson, 2000a: 54-55). The information to
be found in events about an affordance includes “relevant environment features, the
activity of the organism, and the consequences that ensue as well as the relations

among these” (Gibson, 2000a: 54). Bingham (2000) argues that events are perceived
and offers a critical evaluation of Stoffregen (2000). Bingham counters “events are
not properties. Events are substantial, spatiotemporal things that can have or exhibit
properties and that can enter into relations with other properties things, that is, other
events” (Bingham, 2000: 30). It is argued that, since events can have properties, and
that properties can support behaviour of a more or less particular form, then events are
not “intrinsically free of reference to animal behaviour” (Bingham, 2000: 32).
Moreover, that animals do perceive events. Whilst objects are recognised by their
form, events are recognised by their spatiotemporal forms, i.e. forms of motion.
Bingham questions Stoffregen’s interpretation of Gibson’s views about events,
claiming that Gibson held the view that events are perceived. To reinforce the overall
argument, attention is drawn to a methodological issue: affordance properties should
not be perceived without perception of the relevant event, this implying the contextual
relevance of affordances.
Design of affordance: Norman (1988: 188) argues that a design is likely to have failed
if it requires instructions; that “it should exploit natural relationships and natural
constraints”. However Norman (1988, 1999, 2013) acknowledges how concept of
affordances has been adopted by the design community. One mode of adoption is
presented by Hartson (2003), who proposes four affordances, each of which are
selected for how they assist users engage with computers.
Norman’s perceived affordance becomes cognitive affordance, helping users
with their cognitive actions. Norman’s real affordance becomes physical
affordance, helping users with their physical actions. We add a third kind of
affordance that also plays an important role in interaction design and
evaluation, sensory affordance, helping users with their sensory actions. A
fourth kind, functional affordance, ties usage to usefulness (Hartson, 2003:
316)
However, Norman (1988, 1999, 2013) conceded that adoption has not necessarily
been in the manner as intended, in part, arising from misunderstanding about the
concept. One feature of this misunderstanding is the distinction between an affordance
and the information to signify an affordance as depicted by Norman (1999, 2013).
This distinction between the design of affordances (utility) and the design of
information that reveals the affordance (usability) is developed by McGrenere & Ho
(2000). They discuss the affordances of software in terms of the functions available to
the user (e.g. text editing, drawing), using the example of a scroll-bar to raise the
question of whether it is an affordance or information about an affordance, a similar
argument used by Norman (1999) recording an icon on a screen and whether it is an
affordance or signifies a affordance. In contrast to Norman, for whom the icon is a
sign or ‘learned convention’ and thus is not an affordance, McGrenere & Ho (2000)
argue that the notion of nested affordances explains how the affordance of the
functionality of software is enabled through the screen’s ‘button’s’ affordance of
clickability and that the scrollbar (an icon) is an object that affords scrolling. An
alternative view to the information-affordance debate relates to the distinction
between action and the control of action, whereby affordances enable action, whilst
information about affordances enable the control of action (Stoffregen, 2000).

5.0

Discussion – Conclusion

The preceding evaluation of the concept of affordance draws attention to the problems
of definition, lack of clarity about how an affordance is enacted as well as the issues
about whether affordances are perceived or interpreted, are relational or dispositional,
or are representational or performative. It further reveals that affordances can be
viewed in terms of material, social, spatial and temporal dimensions. Finally, there are
debates surrounding the design of affordances. Overall, the single word ‘affordance’
is thwarted with multiple interpretations and consequent tensions. However, does it
matter?
Take the example of a door handle as illustrated in figure 1. How does the concept of
affordances explain use of this door handle and what can this reveal about different
interpretations of the concept of affordance? The two doorknobs, by virtue of their
shape, can be perceived as the means by which the door could be both opened by
those authorised and secured. They appear to offer multiple affordances. Whilst the
upper doorknob may be perceived as offering the most likely means of releasing and
opening the door, no such mechanism existed, with the signifiers being deceptive and
the affordance of enabling the door to open being false, it does not exist.

Figure 1.

No ordinary door handle.

In the case of the lower doorknob, the affordances offered are not so apparent. To
open the door, the more astute might interpret the black end section of the knob to
signify a scanning mechanism that requires something (e.g. a swipe card) to activate

it, but there is nothing visible to indicate what this might be. The information
signifying the role of the black end portion requires knowledge as a prerequisite of
being able to use this lower doorknob and thus actualise its affordance. However, it is
not apparent that this mechanism that controls the securing of the door, collects data;
that this door handle is part of an information system that is invisible to the user of the
door handle. Data is collected about the user entering the room, though not, in this
case, of leaving the room, with the door handle on the other side of the door being a
conventional door handle. These affordances are hidden. This distinction between
visible, invisible and false affordances as well as the role of signifiers supports both
Norman’s (1988, 2013) and Gaver’s (1991) conceptualisation of affordances.
What differentiates this examination of a door handle from other studies featuring
door handles (e.g. Norman, 1988; Gaver, 1991; Koutaminis, 2005) is that it reveals
the affordances offered by a sensor embedded in the handle. These affordances are not
visible, nor easily discoverable. It requires the person who created and embedded the
sensor to share knowledge with others, these being those who will collect and use the
data. That the designer of the door handle has rendered the affordance of collecting
data invisible, suggests that a, perhaps unconscious, decision has been made about the
status of the main users of the door handle, the room users. They are to be monitored.
If this one example is extended to the situation where there are many sensors in
operation, it invites questions about the broader ramifications of sensors distributed
throughout technologies that become part of the everyday fabric of what are being
referenced under the terms of ‘smart technologies’, ‘the internet-of-things’ and ‘smart
cities’. The affordances of smart technologies are not perceptible other than through
the appearance or form of each artefact. Gibson’s argument that affordances are
perceptible collapses with the design of ‘smart’ technologies and the invisible
affordances of data collection, as revealed with the sensor in the door handle.
Affordances concern what is possible, but digital technologies, particularly those
involving sensors, do not require perceptual forms to enable them to act. Moreover,
the affordances of artefacts are enabling other artefacts to act, invisible systems
comprising of interacting artefacts, serving people in terms of sensing their
requirements and performing accordingly (e.g. activate lights when a room is being
entered; remotely report fridge food stock levels).
However, a more sinister aspect is revealed. Few were aware that data about who was
using the door was being collected. Covert data collection raises the issues of
transparency, security of data collection, ownership of data collected and the invasion
of the privacy of those about whom the data relates to, as well as the possibility of
data exploitation and abuse. This creates an imbalance between those who are
knowledgeable and have access to these invisible affordances, and those who are
unaware of them. This invites the anti-social possibilities of monitoring, lurking,
bullying…
So what does this case reveal?
This case substantiates a number of the dimensions raised previously. The intentional
nature of behaviour draws attention to the distinction between Gibson’s and Norman’s
formulisation of affordance. Gibson’s formulization was conducted within the domain
of the natural world, which did not discriminate between human and animal and

emphasized the purposive nature of their behavior. Instead, Norman’s formulation
draws attention to the significance of cognition, interpretation, the purposeful nature
of human behavior and the designed nature of artifacts.
The case-study presented supports this latter formulization, suggesting that the
affordance of an artifact is latent (dispositional) until such time that it is discovered
and actualized by a person using the artifact. Affordances are not properties, but
properties provide affordances. Affordances do not exist in isolation but as packages
or ‘affordance configurations’ (Lindberg & Lyytinen, 2013), which can be either
visible or invisible. This is very evident with information systems and the everyday
use of these. Users engage through the signage that reveals what possible actions can
enacted, but this assume knowledge which must be learnt. Thus, an affordance is not a
representation of possible actions (Steedman, 2002), but is actualized through its
enactment, actualization arising from perceiving how the artifact can be used. In other
words, an affordance is performative through its enactment in the sense of Latour
(1986) and Pickering (1993) as opposed to its other possible meanings (Harwood &
El-Manstrly, 2012). Its enactment reveals and defines the affordance from the many
possible affordances an artefact can potentially offer. Unless an affordance is enacted,
it only exists as a possibility and thus need never be enacted and hence is superfluous.
Whilst Markus & Silver (2008) claim that affordances offer ‘potentially necessary’
conditions for usage, but that that these are neither necessary not sufficient conditions
for usage, it can be argued that affordances are necessary, but not sufficient conditions
for usage. If there is no affordance, then there cannot be a possibility for action,
without which there can be no action. For conditions to be sufficient, then this invokes
a social context and shared knowledge about conventions of behaviour and practice.
Cars afford the possibility of killing, but there is a convention about cars not being
used for this activity, irrespective of the knowledge held about how to use a car. It is
postulated that the situatedness in which an affordance is enacted provides the
necessary, and sufficient conditions for an affordance to be actualised. This relational
view of an affordance concurs with Chemero (2003).
As a concept, affordance offers a useful bridging device to explain the interplay
between the artefact and human user. It draws together a variety of dualities: subjectobject, user-artefact, design-use, perception-intention. These dualities dissolve within
the concept of an affordance revealing a complex dynamic over space and time within
the most mundane of enactments. However, if an affordance is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for an enactment, and that the situation within which an
affordance is latent, provides the necessary and sufficient conditions, then this invites
questions about what constitutes the situatedness of actualisation. It draws attention to
the situatedness of practices (Suchman, 1987) and ‘affordance ecologies’ (Lindberg &
Lyytinen, 2013). More pragmatically, the concept of affordance draws attention to the
manner in which newer forms of technology (e.g. social media, smart phones) are
used.
To conclude, the issue is not about the usefulness of the term but about the manner of
its use. It was claimed in the Introduction that the concept of affordance ‘provides a
bridge between the social and artefact, offering a concept to explain why a technology
is taken up’. However, as an explanatory bridging device it loses its power due to the
multiple ways in which the concept can be constructed. This is problematic in that it

then becomes difficult to understand in what specific sense an author is using the
term, if there is any. Indeed, it cannot be assumed that there is a specific construct
underpinning an author’s use of the term. For example, Lee (2010) argues in his
critical commentary about IS research, that whilst researchers may espouse a belief in
‘scientific rigour’, which calls for key terms to be rendered into ‘scientific constructs’,
in practice, IS researchers can lack rigour in their use of terms, with usage being that
of the ‘everyday, layperson sense’. Irrespective of whether this is the case, the term of
affordance is a useful term as it is potentially laden with meaning. However, if this
meaning is to be usefully conveyed and the concept of affordance is to perform as a
bridging device, then attention needs to be given to the manner in which the concept
is constructed in its use and how this is articulated.
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